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I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of labor relations, the decade of the seventies will
almost certainly be hailed as the time public sector unionism came of
age. Unprecedented growth of public employees, from 10 to 15
million in the last decade,1 has been accompanied by a 600 percent
* B.S., J.D., University of Toledo; LL.M., University of Michigan. Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, The College of William and Mary.
1. Hearings on H.R. 12532, H.R. 7684, and H.R. 9324 Before the Special Sub-
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growth rate of public employee union membership over that of
private union membership. 2  Presently, of the over 10 million per-
sons employed by state and local governments, about 28 percent are
covered by union agreements and over 2.6 million belong to unions.3
Numerous reasons exist for this organizational revolution and
although historians can trace its origin to several dominant factors
such as traditionally low government pay, paternalistic personnel
practices, and collective bargaining legislation, the present reality
suggests that it has become institutionalized and self-sustaining in
its own right.4 Individual public employees have come to believe
that they are not fully participating in the benefits of society. They
have found individual petition to their government employer too
often ineffective, and so, these individuals, like their private sector
counterparts, have banded together to form a power base from
which they seek to gain as a group that which they could not gain
as individuals. The depth of their resolve is reflected by their
increasing militancy.
Authority for dealing with this rising militancy of public em-
ployees and increasing public concern over conflicts affecting labor
relations in the public sector has been vested over the years with
the states.5 And, as expected, the states have responded in diverse
ways, with approximately 36 states having enacted some form of
affirmative bargaining legislation covering public employees.6 This
statistic, however, tends to overstate the degree of response of the
states in that only 20 have enacted reasonably comprehensive stat-
committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 70, 71 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
2. Public sector union membership has grown by 88 percent, while private in-
dustry membership increased by 12 percent. Ross, Those Newly Militant Government
Workers, FORTUNE, Aug. 1968, at 104.
3. Hearings, supra note 1, at 71.
4. See, e.g., Weisenfeld, Public Employees Are Still Second Class Citizens, 20
LAB. L. J. 138 (1969).
5. Public employers are exempt from the provisions of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1964).
6. For a summary of state labor laws, see BNA's GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP.
RF-63 51:501-521 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GERR]; and see, Blair, State Legislative
Control over the Conditions of Public Employment: Defining the Scope of Collective
Bargaining or State and Municipal Employees, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3-4 & n. 18 (1973);
and see Hearings, supra note 1, at 132-34.
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utes.7 The remaining legislation is of the piecemeal, gap-plugging
variety covering special interest groups such as teachers and fire-
men and passed in direct response to the political pressure of these
groups. Interestingly, the remaining states without legislation are
not without public sector collective bargaining. Though the state
deliberative bodies with grave solemnity continue to debate the pro-
priety of government bargaining, aggrieved public employees have
taken their case to the courts and have been accorded recognition
of an increasing number of rights. These rights include the right
to form unions, to be free from employer interference with those
rights, and to have enforced those labor agreements to which a
public employer has entered even absent statutory authorization. 8
Thus, extra-legal, de facto bargaining arrangements exist and are
on the increase. It is this development in public sector labor rela-
tions that presents the most disturbing challenge to the public
interest. Unregulated public sector labor relations inherently be-
comes a play of power politics with the stronger party imposing its
terms on the employment relationship without statutory guidance or
limitation. The attempted accommodations of conflicting interests
too easily present the opportunity for compromised employer or
employee rights with obvious and adverse consequences visited up-
on the public interest through inconsistent and perhaps improper
state or local personnel policies or distortion of public budget allo-
cations.9
Explanation for the different approaches and lack of approaches
by the states is readily found in the nature of the public employer.
The proposition that government is not "just another industry"1
avails itself inevitably of lively debate as opponents of public em-
ployee unionism point out the differences between private and
public employers whereas proponents emphasize the similarities of
the employees' needs in both sectors of the economy.
With controversy and concern growing over the degree of the
7. See Brown, Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Perspective and Legislative
Opportunities, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 63-78 (1973).
8. Id. at 78-82.
9. See H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES 26
(1971); and Welling:on & Winter, Jr., The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public
Employment, 78 YALE L.J. 1107 (1969).
10. See generally SORRY . .. No GOVERNMENT TODAY, UNIONS V. CITY HALL
(R. Walsh ed. 1969).
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states' involvement in the labor relations of public employees,
and with Congressional hearings on national legislation giving the
controversy a national dimension, the issue has certainly become ripe
for debate as to whether there is a present need for federal inter-
vention into the area.
Past experience with minimum wage laws, occupational safety
and health laws, unemployment compensation, civil rights legisla-
tion, and private sector labor relations clearly illustrate that when
the states fail to meet a public need, the federal government will
move to fill the vacuum." Therefore, it is the objective of this
article to examine the public need and determine whether or not the
states have defaulted in any responsibility to regulate the labor rela-
tions needs of public employers and employees, and to explore the
feasibility and desirability of federal legislation.
Analysis will focus on the difficulties--conceptual and legal-
of national legislation, the minimum essentials of effective legisla-
tion, state labor laws, and emerging patterns which upon examina-
tion should suggest whether the states have defaulted. Finally,
federal legislative alternatives will be discussed and a proposal for
national minimum standards legislation will be offered.
II. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS TO
FEDERAL INTERVENTION
A. Conceptual Difficulties: Issues of Debate
1. Private versus Public: A Valid Distinction?
Is government just another industry? Debate continues wheth-
er sufficient differences exist between private and public employ-
ers to justify disparate treatment of public employees in the labor-
management relationship. Concern has been voiced that if the
mechanisms of industrial collective bargaining, including the strike
weapon, were to be transplanted into the public sector it would pro-
vide public employee unions a disproportionately large capacity for
power. This economic power when combined with its inherent po-
litical power could adversely affect the normal political decision-
making process by permitting unions to divert public funds away
11. For an example of federal involvement due to state inaction in unemploy-
ment compensation, see Larson & Murray, The Development of Unemployment In-
surance in the United States, 8 VAND. L. REV. 181, 185 (1955).
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from public services into employee benefits.12  More precisely, it is
feared that collective bargaining could transfer public decision-mak-
ing authority away from the legislative bodies to special interest
groups and in large measure affect the legitimacy of government
itself. To judge the validity of this argument it is appropriate to
note the characteristics that distinguish public from private employ-
ment.
The most obvious differences between the industrial and the
public sector are the inherent limitations placed on the government
employer. Constitutional, legislative, financial, political, and mar-
ket constraints all affect the extent to which an employer may act in
a bargaining relationship.' 3 For example, legislation may limit
bargainable subjects for civil service employees and financial real-
ities may be such that the public treasury will not support a union
demand. Yet the evidence mounts that this has not proved a bar
to bargaining over an increasing number of subjects14 nor dissuaded
employees from seeking redistribution of allocated funds.'"
Natural market differences, encompassing the "service motiva-
tion" of government in contrast to the "profit motive" operative in
the private sector, appear to be a valid distinction. The public em-
ployer due to political, legislative and financial constraints, is less
able or willing to "pass on" higher costs to its "consumers" and
since it cannot go out of business it likewise is theoretically less re-
sponsive to economic pressures by the union. However, notwith-
standing the fact that government is unique in having a monoply on
services, in lacking a reflexive nature vis-a-vis market conditions,
and in being service-oriented, public employee unions maintain that
public employees may well be victims rather than beneficiaries of
such an economic system. This further demonstrates the need for
legislation.
12. See note 9 supra.
13. Id., and see Rhemus, Constraints on Local Governments in Employee Bar-
gaining, 67 MICH. L. REV. 919 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Rhemus].
14. See Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH.
L. REV. 885 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Edwards).
15. An overt example was reported in a Michigan public school district where
plans for an expanded vocational educational program were abandoned to meet salary
demands of teachers who were threatening to strike. Rhemus, supra note 13, at 919-
20.
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Additionally, competitive pressures for federal legislation (pres-
ent in prompting passage of the National Labor Relations Act in
the private sector to minimize the competitive advantage that states
without bargaining legislation were able to offer their industries)
is arguably absent in the case of public employees. Government
services are local and intrastate in nature and since, for example,
sanitation services in Detroit cannot be transported to Chicago,
there are really no competitive pressures to which a government
employer needs to respond.
Though the thesis that a non-competitive market does not dis-
advantage a unionized public employer does have a compelling ring
of truth, it is somewhat misleading. A public employee labor dis-
pute has an undeniable impact on the local economy, and with one
of every six employees being a public employee, a clear impact on
the national economy can be statistically substantiated.16  Few
would argue that a disruption of municipal services in San Francisco
would in any way have less of an effect on commerce than would
a disruption of services by employees of many private employers
presently found to be "affecting" commerce under the National La-
bor Relations Act. 17
Again, one cannot help but notice the different focus of the argu-
ments, with those disfavoring legislation emphasizing the nature of
the public employer and those favoring legislation emphasizing the
needs of the employees. On that issue it has been suggested that
"... difficulties in developing viable systems of labor relations ...
stem from an almost slavish adherence to the notion that the public
and private sectors cannot be treated alike. '" Resolution of the is-
sue will come more quickly, in the author's opinion, if the question
is approached from the perspective of what best serves the public
interest.
16. For a detailed treatment of the economic consequences of strikes on strikers
and on the community, see Thiebolt & Cowin, Welfare and Strikes, The Use of Public
Funds to Support Strikers, in LABOR RELATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY SERIES, Report
No. 6, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce (1972). Additionally, state and
local government expenditures for goods and services are big business, accounting for
12.4 percent of the GNP in 1970. Thus any labor disruptions have obvious effects on
commerce. Hearings, supra note 1, at 34.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 152(7)(1964).
18. Edwards, supra note 14, at 886-87.
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2. Is Federal Legislation Premature Due to
Lack of State Experience?
A recurring argument against federal legislation is the relative
lack of significant experience at all levels of government in public
sector labor relations. Former Secretary of Labor Hodgson, in Con-
gressional testimony on the question of federal legislation, stated:
This lack of experience makes it impossible to adequately evalu-
ate the efficiency and effort of various statutory provisions upon
the governmental unit, public employees, and public interest. 19
The argument continues that states have a myriad of political sub-
divisions with varying personnel practices, legislative and political
structures, and fiscal arrangements that make them resistant to any
quick solutions or uniform legislation. Moreover, special occupa-
tional categories such as policemen, firefighters, and teachers may
need special treatment which can best be accommodated by thor-
ough, if not lengthy local decision-making processes.
A corollary argument is that since an urgency does not exist, such
as existed in 1935 prior to passage of the Wagner Act, it would
be ill-advised to "stunt" the continued rich legislative experimen-
tation presently taking place in public labor-management relations
by passing federal legislation.20
Responses to the above arguments include the claim that em-
ployees' basic rights to freedom of choice and stable collective bar-
gaining relations ought not be compromised by contentions of pre-
maturity of experience. In fact, if experience is to be the guide, a
moment's reflection clearly indicates that continued delay of state
action, whether due to governmental structure or lack of political
pressure to obtain special legislation, has resulted in national em-
ployee safety laws, unemployment insurance and civil rights legisla-
tion. Additionally, proponents argue, an improper assumption is
made that meaningful labor-management bargaining experience
can be built up absent protections of important employee rights
such as freedom from union or employer coercion in exercising free
choice. Proponents of legislation also take issue with the conten-
tion that urgency similar to that preceding passage of the Wagner
Act is not present, arguing instead that in both situations legisla-
19. Hearings, supra note 1, at 281.
20. Id. at 282.
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tion is and was urgently needed to provide a balancing mechanism
to protect labor from the employer's superior bargaining position.
The debate as to whether the experience under state regulation
is such as to suggest that no useful model has yet emerged and that
federal intervention is premature may soon become academic due to
a flurry of judicial and statutory developments discussed below.
3. Federalism: Diversity versus Uniformity
The appropriate relationship between federal and state govern-
ments is a matter of continuing debate, and the arguments against
federal legislation pick up on its theme that public employee labor
relations is a matter best left to the control of the states. The
thesis is that even if model legislation could be fashioned from the
states' experience in public sector labor-management relations it
would be inappropriate to devise national uniform legislation and
in a blanket-like fashion impose it on the states. This, it is argued,
would strike a fatal blow to the basic tenets of federalism which
guarantees needed diversity and experimentation in reaching solu-
tions to very different and complex problems in state and local gov-
ernment. Again the issue arises whether legislation would or
should interfere with the intricate balances of state and local govern-
ment structures.
Those who oppose waiting for the states' further "experimenta-
tion" raise the question how long the period of gestation is to be
when important employee rights are being sacrificed in the interim.
Although debate may remain on diverse and controversial ap-
proaches used on some issues such as impasse resolution and the pro-
priety of interest arbitration and the right to strike, general prin-
ciples of public sector labor-management relations have evolved
to a point where the evidence is in on the need for elections, em-
ployee free choice, and prohibited practices. State legislation has
existed for fourteen years, and one must question the bona fides of
the diversity-experimentation argument.
The depiction of federal legislation as bringing bland uniformity
and non-innovative collective bargaining practices and procedures
likewise appears tenuous. The National Labor Relations Act il-
lustrates that fear of uniformity is not based on fact. Divergent
practices have developed in particular industries such as trucking,
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construction, and the garment industry. Negotiation strategies,
structures and subject matter have likewise been as diverse as the
parties involved and there is no reason to believe that certain pub-
lic sector occupational groups such as teachers and firefighters
would not also be accorded treatment which would distinguish
and recognize the unique aspects of the occupations on questions
of appropriate units and bargaining structures. Federal legislation
would have the further benefit of providing its protective and right-
recognizing powers to all public employees rather than only those
possessing sufficient lobbying strength.
The conceptual difficulties advanced by those disfavoring federal
legislation appear on balance to be unconvincing, although that is
not necessarily to say that proponents of legislation effectively make
their case. Certain deficiencies do appear in the arguments relating
to lack of experience, need for diversity-experimentation, and the
differences inherent in public employers. Yet there are important
concepts- of sovereignty and unique characteristics of public em-
ployers that may necessitate special statutory recognition. There-
fore, wholesale transplantation of industrial relations concepts in-
to the public sector could well be an error. The better approach
lies with accommodating those competing interests while still pro-
viding basic protections to public employees such as "minimum
standards" legislation might provide.
B. Legal Difficulties
1. Sovereignty
The concept of sovereignty is a loosely-defined doctrine used in a
variety of situations for a variety of purposes. Its basic relevance to
the debate of federal public sector collective bargaining legislation
is that state sovereignty ought to be insulated from federal inter-
vention and that state or local legislative bodies as co-equal branches
of their governments cannot and ought not bargain on matters
over which they have been constitutionally entrusted with respon-
sibility, that is, the general welfare of its citizens, including their
employees. In those states without enabling legislation, union op-
ponents maintain that the state is without implied authority to nego-
tiate and to do so would constitute an illegal delegation of pow-
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ers.2 1  Even in states with statutory schemes, the authority issue
may again arise over the question of delegation.
In such states, for example, if impasse occurs, may its resolution
be delegated to a third party ?22 Furthermore, may the doctrine of
exclusive recognition legally preclude government employees or
petitioning citizens from presenting their views and grievances on
bargainable subjects to the governing body ?2' The legal difficul-
ties of the delegation argument are of fading importance as the
courts continue to uphold the propriety and legality of impasse res-
olution procedures, binding arbitration in statutory states, and im-
plied authority in non-statutory states.24
2. Constitutional Considerations
Even in non-statutory states, the issue of public sector collective
bargaining rights persists and bargaining often flourishes in de
facto arrangements. This is due in part to the well established
constitutional right to free association which includes the right to
form and join unions. -5  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
summed up the proposition as follows:
There is no question that the right . . . to associate for the purpose
of collective bargaining is a right protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments to the Constitution .... Nor can it be doubted
21. Cases which support this proposition are Mugford v. Mayor & City Council,
185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945); Communications Workers v. Arizona Board of
Regents, 17 Ariz. App. 398, 498 P.2d 472 (1972). Also see Dole, State and Local
Public Employee Collective Bargaining in the Absence of Explicit Legislative Author-
ity, 54 IowA L. REV. 539 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Dole].
22. See McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Approach to
the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1192 (1972).
23. The constitutional and non-constitutional implications of exclusivity are dis-
cussed in Note, The Privilege of Exclusive Recognition and Minority Union Rights in
Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1970).
24. See Dole, supra note 24; and e.g., Gary Teachers Local 4 v. School City of
Gary, 284 N.E.2d 108 (Ind. App. 1972). Also a collection of state attorneys general
opinions in many states indicates approval of the implied right to bargain. Cited in D.
WOLLETT and R. CHANIN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TEACHER NEGOTIATIONS
1:17 n.54 (1974).
25. AFSCME v. Woodward, 406 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilen-
dis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Melton v. Atlanta, 324 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Ga.
1971); Atkins v. Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. N.C. 1969). Additionally, the
Supreme Court while upholding the right of states to prohibit strikes also indirectly
upheld the constitutional right of public employees to form and join unions. United
Fed. Postal Clerks v. Blount, 404 U.S. 402, aff'g -mem. 325 F. Supp. 879 (D. D.C.
1970).
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that actions under color of law which infringe upon this funda-
mental right may be properly enjoined by a federal court.2
The courts have not, however, recognized any constitutional right of
employees nor duty of employers to bargain, though case law is de-
veloping which suggests that the right to associate may be empty
and meaningless without a corresponding grant of recognition from
the public employer.2 ' The law then in its present state does not
compel a public employer to bargain, but under concepts of implied
statutory authority it may negotiate even absent enabling legis-
lation, though that matter is still litigated. 28  The point to be
made here is that with or without legislation, public employers are
bargaining with some of their employees which raises an additional
constitutional question of whether those employees who are not ac-
corded the right to bargain are being denied equal protection of the
law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The issue of denial of equal protection is raised by those seek-
ing to require the government to pass bargaining legislation. The
argument is that when a government (state or federal) establishes
a scheme of private sector bargaining, but none for the public sec-
tor, it is a denial of equal protection. The correlative but narrower
issue is whether a state or local government can select different
categories of public employees and provide bargaining rights for
some but not others. Years of traditional distinction between pri-
vate and public employment have resulted in a disparity in statutory
benefits and protections, but courts have overwhelmingly upheld
the distinction." Also, courts have generally upheld a government's
right to accord different benefits and protections to different cate-
gories of public employees. ° The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
26. Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n v. Lewallen, 72 L.R.R.M. 2071, 2072 (7th Cir. 1969);
accord, Hanover Twp. Fed. Teachers v. Hanover Community School Corp., 457 F.2d 456
(7th Cir. 1972); Beauboeuf v. Delgado College, 428 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1970).
27. Richmond Educ. Ass'n v. Crockford, 55 F.R.D. 362 (E.D. Va. 1972); cf. Wil-
liams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 41 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
28. For a discussion of this issue, see Brown, supra note 7, at 81-82.
29. United Fed. Postal Clerks v. Blount, 404 U.S. at 882-83, reaffirmed the prin-
ciple that the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid discrimination if any state of
facts reasonably may be construed to justify it. See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961); and Developments in the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1076-1132 (1969).
30. Beauboeuf v. Delgado College, 303 F. Supp. 861, aff'd in part 428 F.2d 470
(5th Cir. 1970).
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had the issue presented to it whether a city could negotiate with
some groups of public employees, but not teachers.31  The court
found that teachers had been legislatively classified differently from
other public employees in many ways and it was not unreasonable
nor unconstitutional to exclude teachers from a public employees'
labor relations act. 2
The court added that -[ilt would appear that equal latitude
may be exercised by executive officials in determining whether they
should bargain collectively with school teachers as well as with
various other classes of public employees." 3
Under traditional equal protection analysis, a legislative classifi-
cation must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no
rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.3 4  The
"strict scrutiny" constitutional analysis, whereby a government may
interfere with fundamental rights only upon a showing of a com-
pelling state interest, would appear inapplicable to the question of
legislation covering only private versus public employment due to
the fact that courts have found there is no fundamental right to
bargain.3 5 In the Beauboeuf case, discussed above, which examined
the right of government to negotiate with selected categories of
employees, the court applied the "rational relationship" standard in
sustaining the constitutionality of the statute and that would
appear to be the standard that will be used on this question for the
foreseeable future. Therefore, it can safely be predicted that the
absence of federal public sector labor legislation will continue to
remain unaffected by claims of constitutional deficiency.
3. Constitutional Basis of Federal Legislation
Paramount to any discussion as to the propriety of federal legis-
lation is a decision on its legality. Assuming arguendo that such
31. Id.; and see Minneapolis Fed. Teachers Local 59 v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn.
347, 147 N.W.2d 358 (1966).
32. 303 F. Supp. at 866.
33. Id.
34. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 505(b) (1956).
35. See, e.g., Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n v. Lewallen, 72 L.R.R.M. 2071 (7th Cir.
1969); and, for a comprehensive discussion of developments under the Equal Protection
Clause, see Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee--Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L. J. 1071
(1974).
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legislation is proper, the question remains whether it is constitution-
ally permissible. The conceptual difficulties presented by concepts
of federalism and sovereignty, wherein it is argued that state and
local governments should retain control over matters relating to its
employee relations, are of fading import. The federal government
has often rejected the position that these matters are of only local
concern and without effect on interstate commerce and has passed
far-reaching legislation under its authority to regulate commerce.36
The evolution of judicial interpretation of the commerce clause
has been one of steady expansion as applied both to private and
public employment. In the private sector the Supreme Court has
ruled that federal regulation of labor relations is a proper constitu-
tional exercise of congressional power under the commerce clause. 37
The courts have thereafter consistently held that matters which
have the potential of obstructing the interstate flow of goods, even
though involving an employer engaged solely in intrastate activ-
ities, are subject to federal regulation. 8
An increasing number of cases indicate that federal regulation of
public sector employment relations is likewise constitutionally per-
missible under the commerce clause. In 1968, the United States
Supreme Court upheld congressional extension of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to certain classes of public employees.3" The Court
found that "[s]trikes and work stoppages involving employees of
schools and hospitals, events which unfortunately are not infrequent,
36. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
37. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court
stated that
stoppage of operations by industrial strife would have a most serious effect
upon interstate commerce .. . .Experience has abundantly demonstrated that
the recognition of the right of employees to self-organization and to have rep-
resentatives of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining is
often an essential condition of industrial peace.
Id. at 41-42.
38. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); NLRB v. Reliance Fuel, 371
U.S. 224 (1963); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941). The United States Supreme Court noted that, "Congress has
explicitly regulated not merely transactions or goods in interstate commerce but activi-
ties which in isolation might be deemed to be merely local but in the interlacings of
business across state lines adversely affect such commerce." Polish Alliance v. NLRB,
322 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1944).
39. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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obviously interrupt and burden this flow of goods across state
lines." 40
In 1971 President Nixon issued Executive Order 11615 ordering
stabilization of wages, salaries, prices and rents.4' No one would
deny the far reaching effect that such an order had on the internal
employment relations of state and local governments, yet the courts
have upheld the authority of Congress to pass the legislation which
enabled the President to act.4-  And in 1972, Congress passed the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act which extended the coverage
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to state and local gov-
ernment employers.43
Clearly, interstate commerce is substantially affected by govern-
ment employers, both in terms of purchasing power and in the po-
tential impact on the economy caused by labor disputes. As to the
former, testimony adduced at Congressional hearings on federal
labor legislation stated that interstate purchases made for all state
and local governments amounted to an estimated $121 billion in
1970, or 92 percent of total state and local government expenditures,
and accounted for over 12.4 percent of our national GNP.44
An additional constitutional consideration involves sovereignty.
The Supreme Court in Maryland v. Wirtz rejectea the claim that
the federal legislation improperly infringed upon the sovereignty
of public employers. The Court stated: "If a state is engaging in
economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal govern-
ment when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be
forced to conform its activities to federal regulation."4 5 The Court
40. Id. at 195.
41. 36 Fed. Reg. 15727 (1971); 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 2575 (1971),
promulgated pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1969).
42. The United States Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals upheld the con.
stitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 in United States v. Ohio, 487
F.2d 936 (1973). See also California Teachers Ass'n v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch.
Dist., 333 F. Supp. 436 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1965), as amended. This Act sets forth minimal stan-
dards under which a public employer must deal with its employees.
44. Hearings, supra note 1, at 34.
45. 392 U.S. at 197. The Court added: "It is clear that the Federal Government,
when acting within a delegated power may override countervailing state interest whether
these be described as 'governmental' or 'proprietary' in character." Id. at 195. See also
Parden v. Terminal R.R., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553
(1957); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 1975 (1936). In 1973, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the power of the Federal government to regulate the employee rela-
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in commenting on the permissibility of such regulation may have
signaled the future course of federal legislation on public sector labor
relations: "It is therefore clear that a 'rational basis' exists for con-
gressional action prescribing minimum labor standards .... -46 It
is now beyond question that such "minimum standards" legislation
would be constitutional. In the future, opponents of federal inter-
vention must, of necessity, concentrate their arguments on the wis-
dom rather than the constitutional permissibility of such legisla-
tion.
III. FEDERAL LEGISLATION:
A PLAN WHOSE TIME HAS COME?
Many commentators have predicted that federal legislation is in-
evitable and that its passage is only a question of time and strife.47
If this thesis has any realistic viability, then present decision-makers
might responsibly wish to minimize the strife and shift the focus of
at least a portion of their attention from the question of whether
there should be legislation, to what form the legislation should
take. In undertaking this task it is important to examine the legis-
lative accomplishments of the states and to determine whether es-
sential minimum standards of bargaining legislation are identi-
fiable and are being provided or alternatively whether the states
have defaulted.
A. Overview of the Current Status of Public Sector
State and Local Bargaining Law:
Diversity and Uniformity
1. Legislative Developments
Due to the differing political, economic and social circumstances
present in each state, it was inevitable that no single statutory
tions of the states where legislative intent is clear: "Where employees in state institu-
tions, not conducted for profit, have such a relation to interstate commerce that na-
tional policy, of which Congress is the keeper, indicates that their status should be
raised, Congress can act." Employees of Dept. of Public Health & Welfare v. Dept. of
Public Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284 (1973).
46. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 194 (emphasis added).
47. Representative Frank Thompson (D. N.J.), Chairman of the House Special
Subcommittee on Labor reported in GERR, supra note 6, No. 548, at B-17 (1974).
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solution would emerge. Yet regardless of the actual forms of the
statutes, certain elements of coverage can be identified and provide
a useful frame of reference against which evaluations can be made
as to the extent to which a state has responded to the issue of public
sector collective bargaining. These elements include coverage,
administrative machinery, representation questions, bargaining obli-
gations, impasse procedures, strike resolution, and union security
agreements.
In addition to examining the provisions of the reasonably com-
prehensive statutes of general applicability which have been enacted
by some 20 states48 it is also relevant to note the common patterns
of bargaining provisions which have emerged in non-comprehen-
sive state laws. Today, 36 states including the District of Colum-
bia have enacted some form of bargaining legislation with some
or all of its public employees. 49  Most of these laws were devel-
oped in the late 1960's in response to pressures from particular occu-
pation groups such as teachers,5" firefighters, and policemen.5'
While many of these same states permit bargaining for its non-
covered employees even absent statutory authorization,5 2 there re-
main nine states which have no legislation for any of their employ-
48. Those states with legislation covering all or most public employees with one
or more statutes include Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas (with local
option as to coverage), Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Da-
kota, Vermont, Wisconsin. Statutes covering many but not all employees, e.g., all local
government employees, include Connecticut, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
Washing:on. GERR, supra note 6, RF-1 51:1011 et seq. (1974). For a dated, but
broader, discussion see Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports on Public Employment
Labor Legislation: A Comparative Analysis, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 891 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Smith].
49. For more detailed analysis, see Brown, supra note 7, at 62-82.
50. Fifteen states have separate statutes granting the right to bargain collectively
to teachers: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Mary-
land, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washing-
ton. GERR, supra note 6, RF-1 51:1011 et seq. (1974).
51. Ten states have bargaining laws covering most firefighters and/or policemen:
Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Texas, Wyoming. Id.
52. See text accompanying note 24, supra, and see Alley & Facciolo, Concerted
Public Employee Activity in the Absence of State Authorization, 2 J. LAW & EDUC. 401
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Alley & Facciolo); Green, Concerted Public Employer Col-
lective Bargaining in the Absence of Explicit Legislative Authorization: II, 2 J. LAW &
EDUC. 423 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Smith).
[Vol. 5
Spring 1974] PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
ees 5 3 and only nine states which mandate collective bargaining for
all public employees.54
An initial question in any bargaining legislation is the extent to
which coverage is provided. Should all or only some employees
be granted bargaining rights and under one or several laws? The
states' approaches clearly differ on this question 55 with about ten
state statutes covering all state and local employees in omnibus
bills, eight others covering all public employees excepting certain
occupations such as teachers, policemen, or firefighters, and some
providing total coverage contingent on local option. A few stat-
utes cover only state employees, while five others include only local
employees. Special categorical legislation is also common among
state laws, with fifteen covering teachers and five covering police
and firefighters.56 It can be appropriately noted that the apparent
haphazard coverage more likely reflects the political pressures of
particular public sector employee groups than the deep wisdom of
state legislators responding to the unique needs of the different
classes of employees.
The practice of most states in establishing administrative ma-
chinery to implement the bargaining legislation is to place its ad-
ministration with an agency which has or can develop an expertise
in labor relations, rather than leaving enforcement to the courts.
Some eight states and the District of Columbia have created new
agencies to administer the legislation, while fifteen others have
53. There is, however, some legislative activity in several of the following states
without legislation: Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio,
South Carolina, Tennessee, West Virginia. There are other states without positive leg-
islation but they have some authorization for bargaining such as a state attorney general
opinion, e.g., Virginia (1969-70 Va. Att'y Gen. Op. 231). GERR, supra note 6, at
RF-63. In Illinois, a more ambitious program is being attempted by creating compre-
hensive bargaining rights for state employees pursuant to an executive order by the
governor. GERR RF-63 51: 2211 (1974), and the promulgated rules and regulations
are found in GERR No. 558, at E-1 (1974).
54. See infra note 56. Although some fourteen states cover all public employees
by one or more statutes, only eight states mandate bargaining; these are, Hawaii, Iowa,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Dakota.
GERR RF-63, supra note 6. Some other states have permissive bargaining for all em-
ployees, e.g., Alaska, while some have mandatory bargaining for categories of employees,
e.g., Wyoming manda:es bargaining for firemen. Id. With such subtle and not so
subtle legislative distinctions, it is clear that one must closely examine statistics that are
offered on the issue of state involvement in public sector collective bargaining.
55. For a general description of the categories of laws, see Hearings, supra note
1, at 283; for more detailed analysis see GERR, supra note 6, at RF-63, RF-i.
56. id.
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utilized existing agencies such as a state labor department.57 Ten
states have placed responsibilities with specialized employer agencies
like state boards of education and health for teachers and nurses,
respectively. 5
Most states in dealing with representation questions have fol-
lowed the precedents of private sector labor relations in deciding
the appropriate bargaining unit and by what method it should be
determined. Under procedures for permitting selection of repre-
sentatives, most state statutes permit secret ballot elections under
the auspices of a state agency as well as the frequently employed al-
ternative of voluntary recognition which can avoid the election. 9
In deciding the appropriateness of a bargaining unit, both the
scope and the composition of the unit must be determined. At
least 19 states provide that a state agency will make those deter-
minations, whereas 7 states permit local employers to determine
the appropriate bargaining unit.60 While a number of state stat-
utes contain little or no guidance on unit determination, most
agencies commonly apply the community of interest standard em-
ployed in the private sector under the NLRA.6 ' Special limitations
on the scope and composition of bargaining units appear, however,
which are designed to take into consideration the special needs of
the public sector. For example, to avoid the potential disruption
of efficient government, several statutes provide that larger units,
which avoid over-fragmentation, be given every consideration in
determining appropriate units,62 and two statutory provisions re-
quire consideration of existing personnel classification systems.6" A
broader limitation is found under the laws of New York and New
York City which require consideration of the impact of unit struc-
57. See Smith, supra note 52; and see Hearings, supra note 1, at 284.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The test under the NLRA is reviewed in Sheffield Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. No.
122, 49 L.R.R.M. 1265 (1961); and in the public sector see, e.g., City of Warren, 61
L.R.R.M. 1206, 1207 (Mich. LMB 1966). For a more thorough discussion, see Shaw
& Clark, Determination o/ Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Public Sector: Legal and
Practical Problems, 51 ORE. L. REV. 152 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Shaw & Clark].
62. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.604 (Cum. Supp. 1973-74) and
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4327 (c) (Supp. 1972).
63. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.71(3) (Supp. 1973); and L.A. MUN. CODE § 4.822
(5) (19-).
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ture on the public interest.64 The ultimate limitation, however,
can be found in the Hawaii and Wisconsin statutes where bargain-
ing units are statutorily established.65
In ascertaining the composition of the appropriate unit, state
statutes have generally adhered to the NLRA principle that ex-
cludes supervisors from the appropriate unit.66  This concept has
met with some resistance as respects certain types of professional
or white collar employees, for example, department heads and prin-
cipals in the school system 7 and sergeants in the police and fire-
fighter departments. The argument for special treatment of these
employees is that they have traditionally worked as colleagues with
those employees subject to their responsibility, and to artifically
segregate them may create an unnecessary adversary relationship
which adversely affects the public interest. On that rationale, some
state statutes have eased the rule of automatic exclusion of "nomi-
nal" supervisors from the bargaining unit and, additionally, have
granted special negotiating rights to 1true" supervisors.6"
A final representation question deals with the private sector
labor relations concept of exclusive representation. This concept,
adopted by every state but California, requires that all employees
within the unit accept representation by the union selected by the
majority. " Interesting implications of the exclusivity doctrine are
presented in the public sector in that minority unions, non-union
members, and non-employees under constitutional principles should
retain their right to petition their government regarding griev-
ances. However, competing public sector bargaining law principles
64. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 207 (McKinney Supp. 1972); and N.Y.C. CODE §
1173-5.0 (19-).
65. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-6 (Supp. 1971); and WISc. STAT. ANN. § 111.81
(3)(a) (Supp. 1973).
66. See Smith, supra note 52; and Shaw & Clark, supra note 65.
67. For a discussion of the problem in education see Comment, The Bargaining
Unit Status of Academic Department Chairmen, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 442 (1973).
68. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.704 (Cum. Supp. 1973-74), which
permits first-level supervisors to form their own unit to meet and discuss.
69. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13085 (West Supp. 1972). In states without legislation,
courts often hold that there is no implied authorization for an employer to grant exclu-
sive recognition. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. United Packing House & Allied Work-
ers Local 1258, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1970). For a contrary view, see Chicago Div.
of Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App.2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966).
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are developing which would limit those rights at least as respects
minority unions.70
Common to most state negotiating laws are provisions defining
the nature and extent of the bargaining obligation as well as sug-
gesting or stating the proper subjects for bargaining. As to the
nature of the obligation the states have developed both permissive
and mandatory bargaining provisions.7 1  Some states have imposed
a meet and confer obligation,7 2 but the clear majority have estab-
lished a bargaining duty. The basic theoretical difference is that
meeting and conferring, unlike the more strict bargaining duty, does
not mandate that negotiations be carried to an impasse. Whether
that theoretical difference is put into practice is a matter of differ-
ing professional opinion. It has been observed, on the one hand,
that since "unions in the public sector have pressed for the same
type of demands and with the same vigor under both models . .. "
the distinction has become blurred. 7' A contrary position is taken
by Robert Howlett, chairman of the Michigan Employment Rela-
tions Commission, who in a recent speech concluded that in the
meet and confer states, "[r]eports ... lead me to believe that meet
and confer employers have been successful in maintaining the dis-
tinction intended by the meet and confer legislators. '7 4  The obvious
shortcoming of a non-compulsory duty to bargain is the possibility
for sham bargaining. To overcome this difficulty most states have
70. For example, in Wisconsin it has been held that minority unions may not
address school boards in a representative capacity during public meetings on issues un-
der negotiation by the majority union. Board of School Dir. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel.
Comm'n, 42 Wisc.2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969). A further exploration of the im-
plications of the exclusivity doctrine can be made in Note, The Privilege of Exclusive
Recognition and Minority Union Rights in Public Employment, 55 CORNELL L. REV.
1004 (1970). On the related question of the right of individual employees to present
grievances to their employer, all state statutes are modeled after § 9(a) of the NLRA, 29
U.S.C. § 159(a)(1970), which retains that right. Most laws also permit that a union
has a right to be present at the grievance and that no settlement shall be inconsistent
with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 423.26 (1967).
71. See GERR supra note 6, at RF-63; and Hearings, supra note 1, at 132-34.
72. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 450(3) (19- ); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13085
(West Supp. 1973); CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 3505, 3530 (West Supp. 1973); IDAHO
CODE § 33-1272 (Supp. 1973); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1505.510 (1966); ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 342.440, 342.710 (1971). Illustrations of bargaining laws can be found supra note
58.
73. Edwards, supra note 14, at 896. He also maintains that only Alabama, Cali-
fornia, and Missouri have "pure" meet and confer statutes. Id.
74. GERR No. 548, at E-3 (1974).
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followed the example of the NLRA and imposed a "good faith"
bargaining obligation.7
5
Probably the fastest developing body of law in public sector
collective bargaining is the scope of bargainable subjects. 76  Most
states have adopted the broad language of the NLRA which re-
quires good faith bargaining over "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment' 77 and with regard to mandatory
subjects, the parties must bargain until either impasse or an agree-
ment is reached. Without any statutory limitations, bargaining pub-
lic employers have found, often to their dismay, that like their
private sector counterpart, "conditions of employment" is broadly
interpreted to include most matters affecting employees. 78 For exam-
ple, a recent decision interpreting New York's statute expanded the
scope of bargaining by requiring public employers to bargain over
all mandatory subjects "except in cases where some other appli-
cable statutory provision explicitly and definitively prohibits the
public employer from making an agreement as to a particular term
or condition of employment. 79
To avoid such open-ended interpretations, some states, perhaps
in recognition of perceived differences in bargaining in the public
and private sectors, place specific statutory limits on the scope of
bargainable subjects through a management rights provision."
75. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1970). See Shieber, Surface Bargaining: A Problem and
a Proposed Solution, supra.
76. See Edwards, supra note 14, at 908-27.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1970). See also NLRB v. Wooster Div. Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
78. See, e.g., Note, The Scope of Collective Bargaining, 74 YALE L.J. 1472 (1965);
and Oldham, Organized Labor, The Environment, and the Taft-Hartley Act, 71 MICH.
L. REV. 935 (1973).
79. Board of Educ. v. Associated Teachers, 30 N.Y.2d 122, 129, 282 N.E.2d 109,
113, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 23 (1972).
80. For an illustration, see HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-9(d)(Supp. 1971). States
with management rights provisions, covering some employees in one or more statutes,
include Alaska, California, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin. GERR, supra note
6, at RF-1. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) rec-
ommends inclusion of such clauses. ACIR Report, GERR RF 51:101, 112 (1970).
Robert Howlett, Chairman of Michigan's Employment Relations Commission has com-
mented
clearly if the Advisory Commission's advice were followed, collective bargain-
ing could become a nullity .... Experience in the private sector warrants an
opinion that the place for management rights clauses is in the collective agree-
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Those who oppose such a narrowing of scope argue that in the
public sector, economic and non-economic policy questions are of-
ten intermingled and indiscernible, and to restrict the scope would
inhibit if not prohibit employees, especially professionals, from
making valuable contributions to the formulation of institutional
policies.8'
A final source of limitation on the scope of bargaining is exist-
ing law, primarily civil service legislation, which covers many sub-
jects over which unions wish to bargain. Most states which have
considered the problem of potentially conflicting statutory provi-
sions have provided that civil service legislation will take prece-
dence over public sector bargaining statutes. This will preclude any
possibility that these statutory provisions will be the subject of
bargaining. 2
The totality of the bargaining relationship is governed by un-
fair labor practice provisions which seek to guide the conduct of
the bargainers. Some 24 state statutes are patterned after section 8
of the NLRA whereby both employer and employee conduct is
controlled.83 However, two statutes regulate only employer con-
ment; not in the statute .... Our world is too complex and fast moving to
limit the subject of bargaining by statutory itemization.
GERR No. 548, at E-6 (1974).
81. Statutory recognition of this argument whereby certain employees are given
the right to bargain over economic matters and meet and confer over non-economic mat-
ters is being tried by some states including Maine, Montana, and Minnesota. ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965 (Supp. 1972); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 75-6119 (2d Repl.
Vol. 1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.73 (Supp. 1973). Illustrations of statutes limit-
ing employers from bargaining over non-economic matters are Vermont, Wisconsin,
and Oregon. ORE. REV. STAT. § 342.440 to .480 (1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §
905(b) (1972); WIsc. STAT. ANN. § 111.91 (2)(a) (Supp. 1973).
82. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3500 (West 1966) § 3525 (West. Supp.
1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4330(a) (Supp. 1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 969 (Supp. 1972-73); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 178L (1971); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.703 (Supp. 1973-74); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 904 (Supp. 1973);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.100 (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.91(2) (Supp.
1973). For contrary views, see Civil Service Comm'n v. Wayne Bd. of Super., 384
Mich. 363, 184 N.W.2d 201 (1971). Also see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 70124 (West
1965) (transit workers); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(f)(1972)(municipal em-
ployees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 162 App. § 1-19 (1958)(transit workers). For
a discussion of the problem, see Comment, The Civil Service-Collective Bargaining Con-
flict in the Public Sector: Attempts at Reconciliation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 826 (1971).
83. States having both employer and employee unfair labor practices covering
some employees in one or more of their statutes include Alaska, Connecticut, District
of Columbia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin.
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duct,8 4 and six statutes include no unfair labor practices. "  In some
states which have unfair labor practices, the legislators have gone
beyond the typical prohibitions and experimented with provisions
barring political activities,86 interfering with managements' rights,8
and extortion.88
Public sector legislation emphasizes impasse resolution proce-
dures so as to ensure that the government can continue to function
smoothly in dispensing its services.8" The pattern, adopted by at
least 24 states, is mediation and conciliation followed by fact-finding
procedures. ° If impasse exists after these persuasive procedures are
utilized, the question of an acceptable dispute settlement mechanism
arises. The alternatives available include unilateral action by the
employer, strikes by the employees, or some form of binding arbi-
tration.91 Since final resolution of the issue by either party by strike
or unilateral action is always an available option, it is reassuring to
note that interest arbitration, which may be either compulsory or
voluntary, as well as advisory or binding, is increasingly being tried
by the states.9 2 At least fifteen states are experimenting with volun-
GERR, supra note 6, at RF-1; and see Ogawa & Najeta, Guide to Statutory Provision
in Public Sector Collective Bargaining (Univ. of Hawaii, 1973).
84. Rhode Island and Montana (covering nurses). Id.
85. California, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Texas, and Wyo-
ming. Id.
86. Kansas and Montana. Id.
87. New Hampshire. Id.
88. Vermont. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 962 (7) (1972).
89. See generally Barrett, Governmental Response to Public Unionism and Rec-
ognition of Employee Rights: Trends and Alternatives for Resolving Issues, 51 ORE.
L. REV. 113 (1971).
90. Certain employees under various statutes have these procedures in the follow-
ing states. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wisconsin. See generally GERR, supra note 6, at RF-63.
91. See generally McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms: A New Ap-
proach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1192
(1972); and Bernstein, Alternatives to The Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 459 (1971); and Howlett, Contract Negotiations Arbitration in the Public
Sector, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 47 (1973).
92. It should be recalled that "'interest" arbitration which settles bargaining im-
passes by formulating new terms of an agreement is quite different from "grievance"
arbitration, which merely calls for an interpretation of an existing agreement. For gen-
eral discussion, see Note, Legality and Propriety of Agreements to Arbitrate Major and
Minor Disputes in Public Employment, 43 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1968); and Corn-
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tary interest arbitration, 3 while at least five statutes establish com-
pulsory interest arbitration for police and firefighters.94 Only Nevada
has experimented with compulsory interest arbitration legislation of
general applicability, but here the Governor must affirmatively trig-
ger the mechanism before it applies.95
If dispute settlement mechanisms do not resolve the bargaining
impasse, the strike issue comes to the forefront. In the private sec-
tor it is an accepted premise that there can be no genuine collec-
tive bargaining without the right to strike. The possibility of a
cessation of services is the catalyst which helps induce agreement
by the parties. For the most part state legislatures and courts have
not acceded to accepting the above premise and for decades have
prohibited strikes by public employees. 6 However, the penalties
and methods of enforcement vary among the states with some
states providing self-executing provisions which apply sanctions up-
ment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in the
Public Sector, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 260 (1969).
93. Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin are
all experimenting with the procedure. See generally McAvoy, supra note 91. Iowa,
for example, has "final offer" arbitration, GERR RF:2416 (1974).
94. Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island statutes cover police and firefight-
ers, while Vermont and Wyoming cover firefighters only. See McAvoy, supra note
91, at 1194-96. It should be noted that the Michigan legislature liked it so well, it
recently extended its self-expiring legislative provision. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
423.245 (Supp. 1973-74). The constitutionality of such provisions has consistently
been upheld. See, e.g., Warwick v. Regular Fireman's Ass'n, 106 R.I. 109, 256 A.2d
206 (1969) and Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d 387 (1973).
95. NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.150 (1971).
96. Jerry Wurf, President of AFSCME, takes the following position:
Debate over whether workers have a "right" to strike obscures the more im-
portant consideration-namely, how to resolve labor relations problems with-
out strikes. For all of the headlines and verbiage, public employee strikes each
year affect only a tiny percentage of the organized public work force. Ac-
cording to the Labor Department, the work time lost in 1971 (the latest year
available) because of strikes for government [including federal employees]
amounted to only .03% of this total work time, compared to .26% for the
total economy and .32% for the private, non-farm economy.
Statement by Wurf on October 4, 1973, before the Special Subcommittee on Labor of
the House Committee on Education and Labor in a booklet prepared by the Coalition
of American Public Employees 33-34 (Wash. D.C., 1973). The constitutionality of
strike prohibitions has been consistently upheld by the courts. See United Fed. of
Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'g. mem., 404 U.S. 802
(1971); and Anderson Fed'n of Teachers Local 519 v. School City of Anderson, 252
Ind. 558, 251 N.E.2d 15 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 928 (1970). For general dis-
cussion, see Shaw & Clark, Jr., Public Sector Strikes: An Empirical Analysis, 2 J. LAW
& EDUC. 217 (1973); and Lightenberg, Some Effects of Strikes and Sanctions-Lega
and Practical, 2 J. LAW & EDUC. 235 (1973).
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on the occurrence of strikes,97 and others which require some prior
affirmative enforcement action by the employer. 9 Penalties also
vary from discharge and ineligibility for a period of years 9 to
fines100 and imprisonment.10 1
Only recently, perhaps in view of the fact that strike prohibitions
do not necessarily prevent strikes and that all government services
are not "essential," has state legislation begun to permit strikes
under certan conditions. Seven states presently permit a limited
right to strike for certain employees after exhaustion of impasse-
resolving procedures specified in the statutes10 2 and all of the
statutes limit the right by providing that an injunction may be ob-
tained upon proof of danger to the general welfare. 10 3  In light
of this clear trend, it has become evident that statutory authoriza-
tion of strikes under certain conditions combined with impasse pro-
visions will become increasingly prevalent in public sector collec-
tive bargaining legislation.
The final area requiring attention in evaluating state legislative
treatment of important elements of bargaining is that of union se-
curity devices. State statutes typically prohibit union shop agree-
ments because they require an employer to discriminate on the basis
97. But even with automatic provisions, procedural deficiencies may negate its self-
executing nature. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Cincinnati, 26 Ohio St.2d 228, 271 N.E.2d
284 (1971); and for a general discussion of the problem, see Smith, supra note 52.
98. For example, in Delaware, Michigan, Rhode Island, and Washington, strikes
are merely declared illegal and the state must act to enforce the statute by injunc-
tion or other means. Difficulties can also arise in this situation. E.g., in School Dist. v.
Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W. 2d 206 (1968), the court refused to
issue an injunction absent a showing of violence, irreparable injury or breach of the
peace, notwithstanding the fact that the strike was in violation of state law. See
Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention of Strikes in
the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. REV. 260 (1969).
99. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-55 (Supp. 1973).
100. See Seidman, State Legislation on Collective Bargaining by Public Employees,
22 LAB. L.J. 13, 19-20 (1971); Smith, supra note 52, at 910-14.
101. Id., and see Iowa's new statute which uses a variety of penalties. GERR No.
553, at 8-10 (1974). Also, a federal employee who strikes is guilty of a felony. 18
U.S.C. § 1918 (1970).
102. Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont
have legislation permitting some categories of public employees to strike under restricted
circumstances. GERR, supra note 6, at RF-1.
103. E.g., Hawaii requires exhaustion of certain impasse procedures and a notice
of intent before a strike may legally occur, and even then it is subject to an injunction
if it impairs the general welfare. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1971). And
see generally Symposium, Limited Right to Strike Laws-Can They Work When Ap-
plied to Public Education?, An Overview, 2 J. LAW & EDUc. 673 (1973).
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of union membership. For that reason, the use of dues check-off
is becoming increasingly prevalent."°4
Most of the recent union activity in this area is directed at nego-
tiating agency shop provisions which, while not requiring union
membership, do require payment of a fee to cover a "fair share"
portion of the services provided by the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative.1"5 Several state statutes have taken the initiative and
headed off certain litigation on this controversial, issue by permit-
ting agency shop or service fee provisions." 6
2. Judicial Developments
Even in those states without public sector bargaining legislation,
bargaining by public employers and employees flourishes.0 " Un-
fortunately, the resulting extra-legal, de facto bargaining relation-
ships and bargained results are not subjected to state supervision.
This continued absence of a statute covering all public employees
has given an implicit mandate to the courts to develop a common
law of public sector labor relations. In response, the courts have
created a mosaic of recognizable rights of public employees to form
and join unions, to seek recognition for purposes of bargaining,
to be free from improper employer discrimination or interfer-
104. Although many states have followed the NLRA model in prohibiting em-
ployer discrimination for union activities or union membership, they have not added
the NLRA provisos which expressly permit union shops, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
Express prohibition of union shops is found in 19 states which have right-to-work leg-
islation. These include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. For a compilation of the
statutes and case law interpretations, see NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK COMMITTEE,
STATE RIGHT-TO-WORK LAws (1972).
105. See generally Comment, Impact of the Agency Shop on Labor Relations in
the Public Sector, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 547 (1970); Note, Labor Law-Public Em-
ployment-Arbitration and Agency Shops as Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining, 14
WAYNE L. REv. 1238 (1968); Ward, Union Security in Teacher Contracts, 22 LAB.
L.J. 157 (1971).
106. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.210 (1973); HAWAII REV. STAT. §
89-4(a) (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 1101.705 (Supp. 1973); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 111.70(2) (Supp. 1973). For an elucidation of arguments on the legality of
agency shops absent legislative authorization and case law which prompted legislation
in Michigan, see Smigel v. Southgate Community School Dist., 24 Mich. App. 179,
180 N.W.2d 214 (1970), aff'd mem., 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.E.2d 305 (1972).
107. See Brown, supra note 7, at 79-82. See also Alley & Facciolo, supra note 56;
and Green, Concerted Public Employee Activity in the Absence of State Statutory
Authorization: If, 2 J. LAw & EDuc. 419 (1973).
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ence while engaging in those activities, and to have labor agree-
ments judicially enforced.
It has been established that there is a constitutional right to form
and join unions, 0 8 although thus far that right has not given rise
to a constitutional right to bargain.' However, aside from con-
stitutional considerations, judicial precedent is building that permits
a public employer, if it wishes, to engage in collective bargaining
and to negotiate an agreement absent statutory authorization." 0 But
notwithstanding the fact that an employer may choose to negotiate
with its employees, judicial approval is still somewhat of a sporting
proposition due to entrenched arguments of sovereignty and illegal
delegation of powers."'
B. Evaluation of State Involvement in
Public Sector Labor Relations
1. Emerging Patterns of Minimum Standards Legislation
It has been argued that federal legislation is yet inappropriate
because there is in the words of former Secretary of Labor Hodg-
son:
[A] lack of consensus among the states on the critical issues in
public sector labor relations; [and therefore, this diversity and]
haphazard mixture of statutes, local executive orders, resolutions,
ordinances, court decisions, and civil services statutes and proce-
dures [indicate the] lack of any common pattern in current State
legislation dealing with public employee bargaining [upon which
federal legislation can be based]. 12
Whether or not a "model system" has emerged, it would seem only
appropriate, after over a decade of state experience with public
sector bargaining, that an assessment be made of how well the
108. See Brown, supra note 7, at 79-80; and see text accompanying notes 28-31
supra.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Chicago Div. of Ill. Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d
456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966); IBEW Local 611 v. School City of Gary, - Ind. App.
- , 284 N.E.2d 108 (1972); Board of Regents v. United Packinghouse Food & Allied
Workers, 175 N.W.2d 110 (Iowa 1970). See Dole, supra note 24; and Alley and Fac-
ciolo, supra note 56; and Green, supra note 56.
111. E.g., see Mugford v. Mayor and City Council, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745
(1945).
112. Hearings, supra note 1, at 283.
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states have responded to the essential needs of public sector labor
relations. And, in a broader perspective, inquiries need to be made
as to whether discernible patterns of legislation are emerging, not
for the purpose of identifying some never to be found "model
system," but for the purpose of ascertaining whether some mini-
mum standards protecting what can be categorized as the essen-
tial needs of public sector labor relations are detectable. An identi-
fication and summary of those emerging standards are given be-
low.
Basic to any bargaining bill is the protection of employee free
choice of whether to organize and join unions. Virtually all states
have come to recognize this right. However, it remains an unset-
tled matter among the states as to whether all or only selected
groups of public employees should be provided bargaining legis-
lation. Thus far, the emerging pattern of legislation indicates a
piecemeal approach is being used by the states. Legislation is be-
ing passed in response to a perceived need which often is coinci-
dent with intense political pressure from the group seeking leg-
islation. It would seem preferable for a government to act rather
than react to a situation of such vital concern to its citizens and to
affirmatively prescribe statutory guidelines applicable to all public
employees under an omnibus bill. This satisfies basic elements
of fairness and contributes to a more economical, smoother func-
tioning labor-management relations process by precluding the pos-
sibility of conflicting rulings and procedures of different tribunals."'
Most state legislation has adopted the position that responsibility
to administer the statute should be placed in an agency which is
empowered to resolve and enforce issues of representation, unfair
practices, and bargaining impasses. It follows that states with
separate agencies presently enforcing separate statutes, for example,
a teachers bill, might profit from combining their administrative
functions and jurisdictions.
In deciding the representation issues of selection of the repre-
sentative and the composition of the bargaining unit, most states
have adopted the private sector approach and provided statutory
guidelines for elections, agency determination of bargaining units,
113. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) has
urged this approach. ACIR, LABOR MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS 103-04 (1969) in GERR RF-1 51:101, 112 (1970).
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and exclusive representive status. Most state legislation follows
the NLRA's prescriptive guideline of looking for a community
of interests in ascertaining the appropriate bargaining unit and a
few states, in addition, require specific consideration of public in-
terest needs such as non-fragmented units and a flexible approach
on whether to automatically exclude all "supervisors" from any ne-
gotiating activities.114
Bargaining legislation most often is premised on the concept
that labor disputes are best resolved through structured, if not al-
ways peaceful, negotiation; and for a bargaining structure to be
fully effective, it must be viewed by both sides to be a fair system.
Therefore, on the debate between meet and confer versus bargain-
ing legislation, the clear body of state law shows an acceptance of
the latter as the preferable system, with duties of good faith im-
posed to ensure its fairness.
Any bargaining obligation in the private or public sector, over
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment is an open ended
proposition with a predictable expanding scope of bargainable
subjects, absent some type of limitation. In the private sector such
limitations as management rights clauses are negotiated by the em-
ployers. In the public sector similar restrictions on the scope of
bargaining have been reserved by specific statutory provisions. There
is no reason to believe that bona fide boundaries on the scope, if
carefully drafted into legislation, cannot appropriately take into
account unique characteristics of public sector employment.115 An-
other limit on the scope of bargainable subjects has been the
competing and conflicting civil service laws. Thus far, those states
which have confronted the problem have rather uniformly re-
served the precedence of such laws over bargaining legislation.
On the issue of dispute settlement mechanisms, the state leg-
islation has paralleled, if not gone beyond, the private sector obli-
gations, by institutionalizing mediation, conciliation, and fact-find-
ing services as a catalyst to break up bargaining impasses. However,
the issue remains; how, when impasse persists beyond the procedures
designed to persuade a settlement, is the matter to be decided. Most
114. See text accompanying notes 64-74.
115. In the author's opinion, management rights clauses are better left to negotia-
tion and not legislative prescription. See discussion on this issue at text accompanying
notes 84-85 supra.
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states continue to prohibit strikes and most legislation does not pro-
vide for interest arbitration; therefore, at the present time although
the body of state law can be identified, it must also be noted that
the evidence is mounting that state experiments in interest arbitra-
tion and the limited right to strike have presented alternative solu-
tions which merit continued testing and detailed evaluations as to
their efficacy.
As to the question of union security devices in the public sector,
the practices of the states vary enough on the issues of agency shops,
dues check-offs, etc., that no pattern can be identified except that
they are increasingly found to be subjects of negotiation, a place
where, as in the private sector, they should most likely be found.
2. Default by States?
What is evident from the above analysis is that in public sector
collective bargaining there has developed a great diversity of legis-
lative solutions to a myriad of local problems peculiar to the special
needs of the public community under scrutiny. However, it is
equally clear that this diversity flourishes within an identifiable and
uniform framework of essential bargaining provisions!
Although progress has been made over the past decade and a
half toward more state involvement in public sector labor rela-
tions, the current legislative patterns show that for the most part
piece-meal and non-comprehensive statutes are yet too common. In
addition to this underregulation, too many public employees are
still forced to litigate the establishment of bargaining rights. These
litigated rights then provide a platform from which a public em-
ployer, absent statutory authorization, may or may not enter into
extra-legal, de facto bargaining relationships. It is this bargaining,
in the absence of comprehensive legislation, that presents, in the au-
thor's opinion, a situation with the potential for a far more devas-
tating effect on our public institutions than does the specter of
federal legislation.
It should also be noted that proponents of federal legislation do
not really seek to establish the point that federal rather than state
legislation is needed to regulate public sector labor relations.
Rather, it is in their view, the lack of substantial state involvement
into the area that creates a need for legislation-state or federal, and
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since the states have not, with over 15 years of opportunity, es-
tablished comprehensive legislation, they conclude that the states
have defaulted and have now turned to the federal government to
act. AFSCME President Jerry Wurf, representative of the pro-
ponents of federal legislation, in lamenting over the current lack
of comprehensive state legislation has declared:
No pattern prevails among the 50 states and 80,000 local govern-
ment units save one-that public employees are always in an in-
ferior, secondary class status compared to workers in private in-
dustry.116
He notes further that public employees have tired of being the
"white rats in a labor-management laboratory" and they want the
stability and equity of a federal law.11 7
In summary, it can be stated that to date an evaluation of cur-
rent legislative developments in public sector labor relations, while
showing an encouraging attempt by some states toward innova-
tive solutions to pressing problems, mostly reveals underaction by
the states toward providing all public employees the essential ele-
ments of public sector bargaining rights. In view of this apparent
default by many states, and in light of the recent statement by the
chairman of the Congressional subcommittee conducting hearings
on federal legislation that it is "inevitable" and that he intends to
enact such a law "as soon as possible,"'1 8 it would be useful to
explore federal legislative alternatives which are available.
IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE ALTERNATIVES
A. Current Federal Proposals
Whether or for how long Congress will permit the states to ex-
periment legislatively with public sector labor relations is a matter
of concern that has reached a national dimension. This concern
is evidenced by the fact that Congress is conducting hearings on
the issue of federal legislation.
Presently, there are five bills pending in Congress, two of which
relate to public employees of state and local governments and
three which deal with federal employment. Over the years there
116. GERRNo. 548, at B-16 (1974).
117. Id.
118. Id. at B-17.
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have been three types of bills introduced with coverage of: (a) all
non-federal public employees under the NLRA; 1 1 (b) all non-
federal employees under a newly created federal law, for ex-
ample, National Public Employees Relations Act;12 and (c) all
teachers under a special teachers law-for example PNA.1"' The
three approaches represent two differing philosophies, with the PNA
(formerly sponsored by the National Education Association) and
the NPERA (endorsed by AFSCME) representing the position
that differences in private and public employment justify separate
legislation for public employees; 12 whereas, the American Feder-
ation of Teachers, affiliated with the AFL-CIO, on the other hand
has long taken the position that any differences between public and
private employment are minimal and that therefore the NLRA
should be amended so as to include public employees.123
In 1973, serious legislative deliberation began to focus on two
of the above bills, H.R. 9730 which would amend the NLRA
to include public employees,2 4 and H.R. 8677 (NPERA), spon-
sored by the Coalition of American Public Employees, which would
establish a separate national public employment relations program.1 25
H.R. 9730, introduced by Representative Thompson of New
119. H.R. 12532, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. (1972).
120. H.R. 7684, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. (1972).
121. H.R. 9324, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. (1972).
122. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 127, statement of Donald Morrison,
President, Nat'l Educ. Ass'n.
123. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 191, statement of David Selden, President,
Am. Fed. Teachers, AFL-CIO.
124. H.R. 12532, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973). This is the same as H.R. 12532,
supra note 123. On April 2, 1974, an identical bill was introduced into the Senate
by Senator Williams (D. N.J.), Chairman of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare
Committee. S. 3294. GERR No. 549, at B-8 (1974).
125. GERR RF 51:181 (1973). This is the same bill introduced in 1971 (H.R.
17383) and 1972 (H.R. 7684). An identical bill was introduced in the Senate on April
2, 1974 (S. 3295) by Senator Williams. GERR No. 549, at B-8 (1974). The NEA
has shifted its support from categorical to the omnibus legislation of H.R. 8677. Its
President, Dr. Wise, in a statement before the Hcuse Committee said: "Our experience
has convinced us that similarities among the various categories of public employees out-
weigh the dissimilarities and that there are certain well-recognized principles and
procedures that should be uniformly applied to all public employees." Contained in
booklet on recent testimony on H.R. 8677 prepared by Coalition of American Public
Employees 24 (Washington, D.C. 1973). The final day of hearings on the federal
legislation ended March 7, 1974, and the subcommittee is now assessing the testimony
which began in October, 1973 as it might bear on the proposed legislation. GERR
No. 545, at B-3 (1974).
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Jersey, chairman of the committee conducting the hearings, seeks
to remove the exemption presently possessed by state and local
governments from the provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act.12" This would preempt state legislation and provide public
employers and employees the same rights and responsibilities ob-
tained by private employers and employees including the use of
the NLRB in enforcing the bargaining relationship, adherence to
the prior decisions of the NLRB, and the right to strike. Notice-
ably absent of course is any requirement of exhaustion of compre-
hensive impasse machinery prior to striking,127 or any limits or al-
ternatives to the strike as have been tried at the state level.
The other bill under discussion, H.R. 8677, introduced by Rep-
resentative Clay of Missouri, having many co-sponsors, and en-
dorsed by the powerful Coalition of American Public Employees
would apply a new law to state and local labor relations throughout
the nation.
Jerry Wurf, President of AFSCME, whose -inion is a member of
the Coalition, has acclaimed H.R. 8677 as a "workable system for
extending to government employees the rights which their private
sector counterparts have enjoyed for many years.' '128
However, not everyone agrees with that appraisal. One com-
mentator has observed:
It is no exaggeration to state that AFSCME's bill [H.R. 8677],
if enacted, would provide organized labor in the public sector with
far greater rights, and far fewer responsibilities, than are presently
possessed by their private sector counterparts under existing fed-
eral labor relations legislation.12 9
In more direct terms, public employer attorney R. Theodore Clark,
Jr. calls the bill "the most one-sided partisan piece of legislation
126. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)(1947), which reads in part that the term employer "shall
not include ... any State or political subdivision thereof .... "
127. Of course the services of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS) are available. For a comprehensive treatment as to what is involved in the
mediation process, see W. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING (BNA 1971).
128. See booklet containing testimony of October 4, 1973, before the Special Sub-
committee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor prepared by the
Coalition of American Public Employees 31 (Wash. D.C. 1973).
129. Baird, National Legislation For Public Employees: "End Run" On the Wag-
ner Act?, 61 ILL. B.J. 410, 411 (1973).
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I've ever seen . . . [it] corrects what union officials find wrong with
the NLRA."' 30
After such diverse testimonials, it is useful to take a closer look
at the major provisions in H.R. 8677. Though patterned after the
National Labor Relations Act, the bill differs in important substan-
tive respects from it and from present state legislation. Its cover-
age extends to all public employees except "officers appointed or
elected pursuant to a statute to policymaking positions' ' 31 and is
administered by an impartial agency which is empowered to enforce
the statute and to make determinations on representation issues.
Opponents suggest it provides the five-member labor commission
more powers than any other state or federal labor board has had.
It permits that the Commission "may" review decisions of trial exam-
iners or regional directors but, if review is declined, such decisions
will be final; and, in addition, it severely limits the authority of
the federal courts to review bargaining unit determinations. 13 2
Representation sections provide for elections, exclusive recog-
nition, and unit determinations based on community of interest and
designed to minimize over-fragmentation.' 33 Supervisors (who are
permitted to bargain) and non-supervisors are required to have sep-
arate bargaining units except as regards firefighters who can combine
supervisors and rank and file employees into a single unit. Like-
wise, policemen, educational employees, and professional and non-
professional employees can combine their units if a majority in each
category votes for inclusion into a single unit.'3
Bargaining obligations are mandatory and must be met in good
faith. 5 The scope of bargaining is broad, including wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment. In addition there
is a duty to negotiate about matters which are or may be the sub-
ject of a statute, ordinance or regulation promulgated by the state
130. GERRNo. 539, atAA-3 (1974).
131. Section 3(c) of the Act. GERRRF51:181,182 (1973).
132. See Baird, supra note 133, at 412; and see §§ 11(d) and 6(g), GERR RF
51:181, 193 and 188-89 resp. (1973). For discussion of these powers as they relate
to the private sector, see Bartosic, Labor Law Refoitm-The NLRB and a Labor Court,
4 GA. L. REV. 647, 664 (1970).
133. Section 6(f), GERR RF 51:181, 188 (1973).
134. Id.
135. SectionS, GERR RF 51:181; § 10(a) (5), GERR RF 51:185; § 10(b) (3),
GERR RF 51:192 (1973).
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or local subdivision, and if legislative action is necessary, to sub-
mit any agreement reached on these matters to the appropriate leg-
islature.""6 It has been suggested that this broad scope may well
lead to an undesirable alteration of established political relation-
ships between branches of government and "even between govern-
ment and the private interest groups seeking to influence its de-
cisions.' '1 37
Both public employers and employee organizations are subject to
unfair labor practice prohibitions but, interestingly enough, the
latter group has a noticeably shorter list of prohibitions. Such pri-
vate sector regulations as secondary boycotts, recognitional picketing,
featherbedding, and hot cargo provisions are conspicuously absent.
131
Bargaining impasses under this law would be resolved through
mediation, under the auspices of FMCS, and fact-finding, which can
be either binding or advisory. If binding arbitration is agreed
upon, the right to strike is forfeited; whereas, if advisory fact-
finding is followed, strikes are permitted after exhaustion of statu-
tory impasse procedures, and are enjoinable only upon a showing of
a clear and present danger to the public health or safety.'
On the issue of union security devices, the statute certainly does
not equivocate, as it mandates authorized dues check-off'4" and
agency shop fees,' 4' and permits union shops.'42 It is interesting
to note that the drafters of the law protected the interests of the
employee organization but did not provide provisions similar to the
Landrum-Griffin Act which seek to protect employees by guaran-
teeing internal union democracy and union fiscal responsibility, and
protecting against union corruption.'43
136. Section 3(m) GERR RF 51:181, 183 (1973).
137. Baird, supra note 133, at 412.
138. Section 10(b) GERR RF 51:181, 192 (1973).
139. Sections 7 and 9, GERR RF 51:181, 189-91 (1973).
140. Section 5(b)(2) GERR RF 51: 181,185 (1973).
141. Section 5(c) Id.
142. Section 5(d) Id.
143. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-
Griffin Act) 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964). For a discussion of the benefits which come
from such protective provisions, see Affeldt, The Labor Bill of Rights-Its Impact Upon
Personal Rights, 37 U. DET. L. J. 500 (1960); and Griffin, The Landrum-Griffin Act:
Twelve Years of Experience in Protecting Employee Rights, 5 GA. L. REV. 622 (1971).
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations recommends inclusion of
such legislative provisions. GERR RF 51:101, 107-08 (1970). See also ACIR model
bill § 15, GERR RF 51:122 (1970).
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In dealing with the federal-state relationship, the statute stipu-
lates that the federal law will preempt all state and local legislation
except where it is "substantially equivalent" to the federal system
as determined by a federal commission."' On the basis of the
above summary it is doubtful whether any current state or local law
could qualify in the present form as substantially equivalent.
Shock waves would be felt by state and local officials by pas-
sage of either of the two federal legislative proposals under con-
sideration, yet passage of some federal law becomes more realistic
each year. Unless careful and serious consideration is now given
to the most desireable form of such legislation, public officials and
the public may find the decision has been made for them in a manner
different from what it would have been had they participated in
shaping it. To encourage responsible government officials to take
the first step beyond debating the propriety of public sector bar-
gaining legislation, a suggested alternative to either of the above
provisions is presented below. The suggestion is a form of "min-
imum standards" legislation which by federal law will mandate
the minimum essential bargaining rights while permitting states
and their subdivisions to continue to incorporate innovative ap-
proaches and solutions to their particular needs.
B. A Time for Legislative Creativity:
A Federal-State Approach Using Minimum Standards
It would be unfortunate when drafting legislation for public
sector labor relations not to take into account many of the unique
characteristics of public employment in state and local govern-
ments, and to fail to utilize the many possibilities for creative leg-
islation which have been suggested by current state laws. To merely
place public employees under the NLRA and preempt state and
local laws ignores the possibility that continued creative legislative
experimentation can continue to improve and make more effective
systems of public sector labor relations. It also increases the pos-
sibility that further legislative innovations will be stunted. On
the other hand, legislation, such as the NPERA, which goes be-
yond the composite profile of most current state comprehensive
statutes, probably is premature due to state inexperience on some
144. Section 12, GERR RF 51:181, 196 (1973).
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of its more controversial provisions and is more likely destined for
extended and spirited debate in Congress.
However, as the debate over appropriate legislation continues,
the fact remains that most public employees are not subject to bar-
gaining legislation. Of the 36 states which have made some type
of legal response to the issue, relatively few have what could be
considered comprehensive statutes. The remaining statutes, which
have relatively limited coverage, leave vast numbers of public em-
ployers and employees without any negotiating authorization or
restraints on the extra-legal de facto bargaining relationships which
arise. In sum, on the issue of state involvement in public sector
labor relations, the current situation can be assessed as one of state
underregulation and non-regulation except in a minority of jurisdic-
tions.
Therefore, to meet the essential needs of these public employees
and to accommodate some of the legitimate state interests of sov-
ereignty and retained local control of labor relations by those most
familiar with its needs, a system of federal regulation is proposed
which within that framework would leave great flexibility with the
states.
The federal-state system would define basic guidelines govern-
ing public sector labor relations reserving ultimate administrative
authority with the federal government, but permitting the states
broad discretion to fashion rules of implementation and to experi-
ment with innovative provisions in substantive areas such as scope
of bargaining and impasse resolution. 145 Under this system, a fed-
eral statute would provide all public employees at the state and lo-
cal levels with certain "minimum standards" of essential bar-
gaining rights, discussed below, and any state with a law in "sub-
stantial conformity" would be given the authority to administer its
own law, subject only to federal administrative review. On the
other hand, any state failing to act or acting in non-conformity would
be subject to the comprehensive federal statute administered by a
federal agency. Most preferably this same federal-state approach
would be applied to the states' political subdivisions on a local op-
145. This type of approach to "state problems" is not new and has been suggested
in various forms over the years. E.g., see statement by Arvid Anderson, Chairman, New
York City Office of Collective Bargaining, Hearings, supra note 1, at 403.
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tion basis, with local laws needing to be in substantial conform-
ity with the state law. 46
The minimum standards approach attempts to separate the issues
of basic bargaining rights from the more diverse and controversial
issues of impasse resolution, union security, etc., and provide a
basic legal framework in which the parties may seek mutual accom-
modation of competing interests within predictable and regulated
boundaries.
The essential minimum standards embodied in a nonpreemptive
federal statute should include at least the following provisions:
(1) Recognition of the right to organize and engage in collective
bargaining by all public employees save elected or high policy-
making officials. (2) Creation of a federal agency fully empow-
ered to administer the statute and make determinations on repre-
sentation, unfair labor practice, and impasse resolution issues and
be authorized to approve or disapprove state labor relations pro-
grams seeking exemption under a substantial conformity provision
which requires a similarly equipped state agency. (3) Repre-
sentation issues should be decided under guidelines which permit
secret ballot elections, exclusive recognition, with appropriate units
to be determined using a minimum standard criteria employing a
community of interest and minimum fragmentation basis. (4) Fed-
eral guidelines on bargaining obligations should include a man-
datory duty to bargain in good faith over wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment and permit binding grievance
arbitration. Debatable topics such as management rights provisions,
union security devices, and bargaining rights of supervisors would
be left for negotiations between the parties and the state legisla-
tures. The guidelines should also require prohibition of unfair prac-
tices by both public employers and public employee organizations
on such important areas as, for example, duties of bargaining and
fair representation. (5) Dispute settlement mechanisms should
require methods of persuasion such as mediation, and fact-finding,
but leave to the state the resolution of whether to use a limited
right to strike, binding interest arbitration, or some other fair and
accommodating method.
It should be emphasized that these "minimum standards" would
146. This approach has worked very well in New York where New York City
has developed its own substantially equivalent law. GERR No. 557, at E-3.
[Vol. 5
Spring 1974] PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING
provide only what must be contained in an acceptable statute and
do not in any way reflect upon additional provisions which the
parties may agree upon if not inconsistent with the federal stan-
dards. This proposal, then, permits a basic uniformity of essential
bargaining principles, while at the same time encouraging con-
tinued diversity and experimentation by the states. Perhaps, to be-
gin the process, a model state statute could be drafted and circu-
lated to the states, suggesting innovations such as are currently be-
ing employed in the private sector.' 47 Also the federal agency
could provide technical assistance to the states and administrative
grants to implement and administer the state acts. And finally,
to encourage continued creativity and innovation and protect
against entrenchment and stagnation, an automatic periodic review,
for example every five years, could be conducted by the federal
agency to reevaluate the federal guidelines looking toward em-
bodiment into the minimum standards of those innovations which
have proved successful.
This federal-state system is not a new concept, rather it is an
adaptation from other federal guidelines legislation such as unem-
ployment compensation.148 This type of a system has proven suc-
cessful over many years experience. Whether the "no man's land"
in public sector collective bargaining caused by state inaction will
be filled by federal regulation or whether discussion of that pos-
sibility will stimulate and encourage sufficient state action is still
debated. It is nevertheless clear, in the author's opinion, that if
legislators have a serious intention of providing a statutory frame-
work for public sector labor relations, then the federal-state ap-
proach with minimal standards is the most feasible federal alter-
native available. It provides minimum antagonism to opponents
and proponents of federal regulation of public sector bargaining.
It establishes uniform essential rights and responsibilities for the
147. For a discussion of this area, see H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, JR., THE
UNIONS AND THE CITIES 88-89 (1971). For an illustrative statute, see Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.70 (Supp. 1972).
148. For graphic description of how and why the federal government entered this
area, see Larson & Murray, supra note 11; and De Vyver, Federal Standards in Un-
employment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REV. 411 (1955). Title Seven of the Civil Rights
Act approaches the problem somewhat differently by having its federal agency "defer"
to factual determinations by a properly constituted state agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
as amended, and see implementing regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12. This deferral
arrangement was specifically upheld in Love v. The Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
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bargaining parties while encouraging continued diverse and inno-
vative solutions to be found for immediate and pressing public sec-
tor labor relations problems.14
149. The viability of this approach was highlighted when at a recent confer-
ence on public employment Robert Helsby, Chairman of the New York State Public
Employment Relations Board called for consideration of the federal-state approach,
".. . there seems to be a clear need for federal minimum standards." GERR No. 557,
at E-3 (1974).
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